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## SHORTER NOTICES.

THE TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE IN MEN AND IN PEOPLES. By Miguel de Unamuno. Translated by J. E. Crawford Flitch, M.A.; with an introductory essay by Salvador de Madariaga. London: Macmillan & Co., 1921. Pp. xxxv, 332. Price, 17s. net.

*Del Sentimento Trágico de la Vida* is the best known work of Spain's greatest literary figure, Señor Miguel de Unamuno, poet, critic, novelist, publicist and Professor of Greek at the University of Salamanca. The book which is widely read in Spain is characteristic of the relentlessness of Spanish mysticism. Its driving force is its personal *cri de cœur*, a sustained passion for personal immortality. In an early page he tells us that "as a youth, even as a child, I remained unmoved when shown even the most moving pictures of hell, for even then nothing appeared to me quite so horrible as nothingness itself. It was a furious hunger for being that possessed me, an appetite for divinity, as one of our ascetics has put it." It is as heartfelt as Mæcenas' well-known lines. The "Spanish Man" is defined as the "man of flesh and bones" and the immortality desired is a real concrete "flesh and bones" immortality.

The sense of the futility of human existence unless crowned and summed up by eternal life is what Unamuno terms "the tragic sense of life" in men and in peoples. The last words are significant, for he insists that his own needs and desires are those of the race; and that he is but the spokesman of a wide-felt craving. He believes that the discovery of death caused men to postulate God, and that reason can only issue in scepticism and a critical attitude towards personal survival. But in this abyss, the scepticism of the reason encounters the despair of the heart and from this conflict is born a new life and the creation of the concept of God and its deliberate enthronement in the mind. "So long," says Unamuno, "as I pilgrimaged through the fields of reason in search of God I could not find Him, for I was not deluded by the idea of God, neither could I take an idea for God, and it was then, as I wandered among the wastes of rationalism that I told myself that we ought to seek no other consolation than the truth, meaning thereby reason, and yet for all that I was not comforted. But as I sank deeper and deeper into rational scepticism on the one hand, and into heart's despair on the other, the hunger for God awoke within me, and the suffocation of spirit made me feel the want of God, and with the want of Him, His reality. And I wished that there might be a God, that God might exist. And God does not exist but rather super-exists, and He is sustaining our existence, *existing us.*"

The translation is excellent and authoritative, for it was corrected by Señor Unamuno himself; it may even be regarded as an advance upon the original Spanish text in which the author admits, as an incorrigible Spaniard, to being naturally given to a kind of extemporisation and to negligencfulness of a filed niceness in words. For readers of other than Spanish nationality the translation serves as a simplification and revision of a difficult author.

HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922. Pp. 336. Price, \$2.25.

It is difficult to see how the author, once having gotten himself tied up in the behavioristic view developed in the first two parts of his book—dealing respectively with the place of habit and of impulse in conduct—can discover any solution for the main problem of the third part of the book,

The Place of Intelligence in Conduct. If "the primary fact is that man is a being who responds in action to the stimuli of the environment," and that "this fact is complicated in deliberation, but certainly is not abolished," "the matter of directness and indirectness concerning the way the stimulus is reached, not the way it operates"; then we shall be surprised indeed if Dewey can discover what he claims to have found, that "deliberation and choice are determining and stabilizing factors" and that they "weight the chances of an alternative in the struggle for future existence." To say that intelligence "functions as an instrument" in human behavior does not eliminate the possibility of regarding intelligence as a refined mechanism. For deliberation may be regarded as "imaginative rehearsal" in the same sense that Bagehot regarded political discussion: vicariously anticipating social behavior, both intellectual operations may be the resultants of the same situation that later will give rise also to the behavior; neither may effect or affect behavior any more than the modern monkey contributes to the heritage of his sapient relative.

Not only are the following statements difficult to reconcile with the mechanistic admissions in the earlier part of the book: "it is our business to watch the course of our action . . . to guide the tendency of our acts . . . to use judgment in directing what we do . . . by fostering impulses and habits"; but the author is bordering dangerously near a faculty psychology. To avoid this, Dewey, like Hobhouse, endows 'every little impulse with a freedom all its own'; but the problem has not been clarified, it has merely been resolved to a 'small little one.' If even in this situation "ends arise and function within action," then "function" means for Dewey not "control" but "integral participation"; otherwise intelligence can differ in kind from impulse or habit only by becoming a resultant experience or a separate faculty. Purpose would thus become either integrated behavior or a force analogous to the transcendent religious beings of medieval theology. Inasmuch as the latter alternative is out of the question—even to discover that the ends of human action are immediate and occasional, rather than remote or absolute, does not avoid the major fallacy of confusing a sublimated resultant of behavior with its driving force—Dewey is confronted with the problem of showing us how knowledge "enables us to employ facts—as a matter of choice—in connection with desires and aims." For analysis and description can account for two of the three elements into which he resolves "freedom," efficiency in action and the capacity to experience novelty, especially when freedom is objectified into the "possibilities open in the world, not in the will." The third factor, choice, remains essentially what it has hitherto been, the name rather than the solution of a problem.

The significance of this book for philosophy is that the pragmatic movement here seems practically to have exhausted itself in its struggle against the realistic schools. The difficulty confronting Dewey is that what to him remains an issue of major importance, the problem of freedom, is for his adversaries a subordinate problem and one in which they can very easily hold their own. As soon as the attention of philosophy shifts to the realist's main problem, the epistemological, not only will the discussion become more general and intense, but the analytical fruitfulness of the behaviorist and pragmatic movements will then first become apparent. Whether this implies a de-socializing of philosophy, and whether any such limitation of philosophical inquiry is desirable, are matters beyond the scope of this review.

C. F. T.

INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Ellery C. Stowell. Washington: John Byrne and Co. Pp. 558. Price, \$4.

"The purpose of this book," says the author, "is to set forth the occasions when a state is justified in employing force or the menace of force to influence the conduct of another state." In the second chapter, which constitutes one-half the bulk of the book, the author, discussing International Police, states that until an organized constabulary is established, international law must "depend mainly upon the action of the separate states to secure redress for their own injuries," although there is some measure of co-operative vindication of the law of nations. The author proceeds then to define the law within this field, especially in order to enlighten public opinion, by which ultimately is determined the grounds of intervention. Violation of sovereignty, support of revolution, and self-preservation are among the concepts legally analyzed; while a number of questions particularly applying to the rôle of America in world affairs are definitely discussed. The success of Political Action is discovered largely in allowing some degree of administrative elasticity to the several states in fulfilling their obligations. The author lays down the rule—"of transcending practical importance for the preservation of a just peace among nations"—"that no state shall unreasonably insist upon its rights or pursue its interests to the detriment of the opposing rights and interests of other states." Although this is regarded by Mr. Stowell himself as a distinct contribution, there is a surprising absence of method or sanction for making this rule effective, especially in a book written from the legal point of view. Many who desire more light on future developments will welcome even more a succeeding volume in which the author promises to discuss "the means or machinery which exists . . . to secure the enforcement of the correct principles" underlying international relations.

PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Louis N. Robinson. Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1921. Pp. ix, 344. Price, \$3.

Ten years of experience as teacher and investigator in the field of social science, supplemented by three years of service as chief probation officer of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia, have helped prepare Mr. Robinson for the writing of this book, which is certainly the most valuable now available in its field.

The author has chosen to restrict his discussion to penology,—the treatment of the convicted criminal,—rather than to attempt to cover in one treatise the whole subject of criminology. The result is a readable volume of convenient size giving the most essential information about, and an instructive criticism of, each of the various methods and agencies of our penal system. Dr. Robinson is neither cynical nor visionary. His treatment of each subject is sympathetic and constructive. The fairness of his presentation of both merits and defects is especially noticeable in the discussion of probation,—the latest and most promising development in penal practice.

The author expresses the hope that his book may be useful to students of social institutions in colleges and universities, that it may facilitate the introduction into law schools of the study of punishment as it actually works out in practice, and that it may assist the general public to become better acquainted with a definite part of our social machinery so that it may participate more intelligently in the orderly development of society. It is to be hoped that a companion volume, dealing with the causes of delinquency and the treatment by police and courts of those charged with crime, may soon appear.

G. P. WYCKOFF.

**STUDIES IN HUMAN NATURE.** By J. B. Baillie, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Aberdeen. London: G. Bell & Sons, 1921. Pp. xii, 296. Price, 15s. net.

The aspects of human nature chiefly considered in this book are those connected with consciousness of the individual. The problems of knowledge are given a clear exposition from the point of view of one who is concerned to show that the knowing process forms only a part, and not necessarily a predominant part, in the life of the human being. The introduction attempts to show that there is a want of continuity in the history of philosophy; but it is difficult to understand precisely what the author means in regard, for example, to the position of Spinoza with regard to Descartes or Kant with regard to Hume. When we turn to the main thesis as to the nature of knowledge, it is of course clear that the consciousness of objects is only a part of the whole psychic energy: but the author does not make very clear his position in regard to what he calls "conception." He says of the "conceptions of the intellect" that "their universality is ultimately derivable from and is determined by the extent to which they reflect the single unity of the individual mind" (p. 24). The author does not work out this traditional idealism; but he says (p. 76): "The truth is not the whole of reality but a conscious realisation of a whole individuality." Elsewhere he speaks of the intellect giving unity to the variety of experience. On this two questions arise: Are not the "unities" of the objective world just as objective as the varieties? and again, Is abstraction illegitimate because in it we take one thing at a time? To treat conceptions (apparently meaning "concepts") as objects is said to be a "revival of mediæval realism"; and the author says that conceptions really "refer" to objects. Apparently, therefore, "object" means for him the composite presentation of which the elements, taken singly, are not objective. But perhaps he does not mean anything so definite, but only that life is one process including many psychic energies of which knowing is one, and that is true enough.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

**THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIETY.** By Morris Ginsberg, M.A. London: Methuen & Co., 1921. Pp. xvi, 174. Price, 6s. net.

Social Psychology has advanced far enough to have its main conclusions stated in a summary form. Mr. Ginsberg has, therefore, performed a task which is useful scientifically in putting together in one small volume the significant doctrines of different schools. It is useful also to the general reader, who nowadays must be abreast of the advances in psychology which have recently occurred. At certain stages in the history of every science it is necessary to make an assessment of results and, if possible, a synthesis of conclusions and their proofs. Social psychology, as Mr. Ginsberg shows, has reached such a stage. The short introduction to the volume under review gives a very valuable summary of the growth of the science which, in a sense, is an explanation of the position taken by the author himself. We are then plunged into the theory of instincts, with which McDougall's name is associated; but the anti-intellectualism, recently current, is then corrected in a following chapter. The Group Mind is accepted as a working hypothesis, but not in the meaning it sometimes bears as a superior reality different from the minds of the members of a group.

We are then given a clear and illuminating discussion of the conception of a General Will, and the book ends with analysis of such current ideas as

those of racial characteristics, the crowd and public opinion. The aim of the author is successfully achieved and the book should be of great use to students in economics and political science as well as to historians. But the situation of the science of social psychology which is revealed in this book is interesting. The doctrines and conclusions of the science are still strangely personal. They are attached to the names of McDougall, Hobhouse, Tarde and others. It may, of course, be necessary in a book which is a summary to bring into prominence the additional literature of the subject; but probably the reason for these references to individual investigators lies deeper. Social psychology indeed has hardly advanced beyond the stage at which "schools" dispute about "doctrines." The evidence is accumulating; but it has not been classified in such a way as to meet with general agreement: and in some cases the personal idiosyncrasies of the scientist peep through the impersonal manner of his statements. For example, Mr. Ginsberg gently suggests that McDougall suffers as a scientist from "general political assumptions and predilections" (p. 164). Certainly McDougall's view of the British Parliament is amusingly simple-minded: and it is to be suspected that the conclusions of many other social psychologists are vitiated by the operation of some of those instincts and emotions which they are attempting to study objectively.

C. D. BURNS.

LONDON.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM AND OTHER SUBJECTS. By Viscount Haldane. London: John Murray, 1922. Pp. xiv, 302. Price, 12s. net.

The title of this book may prove misleading. The term "humanism" in philosophy is now generally associated with the name of Dr. Schiller, who has used it to describe a modified form of Pragmatism. To that Lord Haldane makes no reference. He means by Humanism, in its philosophical reference, little more than what is commonly called Idealism. Probably he avoids the latter term on account of its misleading associations, and also because he is not so much concerned with the foundations of philosophy as with its general applications to human life and thought. The book is further characterised as a companion volume to "The Reign of Relativity," which is an attempt to expound the views of Einstein in the light of Hegelianism. The present work may be regarded as a continuation of that process of interpretation in a less systematic form and with less definite reference either to Einstein or Hegel. The first three chapters contain a general statement of the philosophical position which is summed up in the saying that "Reality is indissolubly one with knowledge, but is neither a construction by merely abstract thinking, on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, has it meaning or existence apart from the setting which thought gives to the particularism implied in all knowledge." Chapters IV, V, and VI, are concerned with Mathematical Physics, Chapters VII and VIII with Biology and Psychology, and the concluding chapter contains some discussion of Mr. Russell's "Analysis of Mind." Most of this has but little bearing on Ethics. Perhaps one of the most interesting parts for readers of this JOURNAL is the account which is given in Chapter III of the new Humanistic movement in the German Universities. "The purpose of the movement," he says, "is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection 'faculty' does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. With the existing distribution of subjects in the universities of Germany it is not sought to interfere. The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another,

and exhibit university teaching not as a collection of fragments isolated from one another, but as the outcome of standpoints all of which have their places within the entirety of knowledge. Thus classics and pure science are to become no longer ignorant of each other, or of what each signifies. This is to be accomplished by systematic work, in which the professors and students are to co-operate. . . . Philosophy is to be made aware of science and science of philosophy, and the atmosphere of literature is to be made available for both. . . . It is hoped that the movement will penetrate through University-trained teachers, with their outlook thus enlarged, to the new 'People's High Schools' which form a fresh feature appearing in German educational life since the war."

This whole movement seems to be one of the most hopeful methods of making the world "safe for democracy," and, through that, safe for moral progress.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

THE NEW IDEALISM. By May Sinclair. London: Macmillan & Co., 1922. Pp. xiv, 333. Price, 14s. net.

This book may be regarded as a continuation of the well-known "Defence of Idealism" by the same author, and it is characterised by the same happy combination of lightness of touch, with patient and penetrating criticism, as that which was shown in the previous work. Like the latter, it is on the whole rather more concerned with the New Realism than with the New Idealism, the whole of the first half and parts of the second being occupied with critical comments on the writings of Alexander, Whitehead, Broad and Laird; just as the earlier book was mainly concerned with the works of Russell, Moore and several American writers (who also are not wholly neglected in the present book). The second half, however, is of a more constructive character, and it is chiefly here that she makes a distinct advance upon her previous work, in which we were, perhaps, rather too suddenly led into a kind of Oriental mysticism. She continues to be an earnest and enthusiastic supporter of Idealism; but she appears to have become somewhat more cautious and critical. Her general contention is that Idealism must take full account of the work of the Neo-Realists—especially the great constructive work of Professor Alexander, whom she is inclined to regard—perhaps rightly—as the ablest of living philosophers. Her closing words may be quoted as indicating the general conclusion to which she is led with regard to the ultimate significance of an idealistic interpretation of the Cosmos: "It is not enough for God to know the Universe; He has to will it before it can be. It is only for God, the Self immanent in the Universe and transcending it, that being and knowing are the same and this only because God's willing is itself part of his knowing. . . . Human progress may be conceived as part of the manifestation. And ultimate reality is not something far off and outside us. Nothing can separate ourselves from God's Self, our being from his being. Only our minds and wills are not always there with us. Yet even they have not to wait for some state of impossible perfection. Every finding of new truth, every creation of new beauty; every victory of goodness, every flash of spiritual insight and thrill of spiritual passion, is, while it lasts, a communion here and now with God."

It is to be hoped that, having now dealt pretty thoroughly and very sympathetically with the New Realists, she will proceed to explain more fully the way in which she conceives that Idealism will have to be reconstructed. In doing this, I believe she would

be considerably helped by taking account of the view of the work of Imagination set forth in Mr. Fawcett's book on "Divine Imagining." Even without rendering this additional service, however, she must be recognised as having made two most interesting contributions to recent philosophical literature. Her new book is provided with a good index; but there are some strange mistakes in the references to the authors—the most remarkable being A. C. Bradley instead of F. H. Bradley.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

INCENTIVES IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER. By J. A. Hobson. London: Leonard Parsons, 1922. Pp. 207. Price, 4s. 6d. net.

This book should be read in conjunction with Mr. J. A. Hobson's *Problems of a New World* (reviewed in the JOURNAL, October 1921) in which he sketches the industrial evolution to which he believes we are progressing, and foresees an extension of nationalisation of certain fundamental industries, such as coal mining, railways, electricity, insurance and banking. It was common talk during the war that industry was in England practically socialised, and that complete nationalisation in times of peace would be but a slight and not subversive step. The existing clumsy and inadequate system, the old order, has obvious defects in intelligent direction. By adopting known methods the output of English iron and steel works could be increased from 50 to 100 per cent; and the lack of expert knowledge and enlightened direction on the part of directors of railways and colliery concerns has been dragged into the light by Commissions. As a system, what Mr. Hobson terms "competitive profiteering" began to show signs of breaking up in 1896, when workers' wages lagged behind the rising profits and prices. The solution of socialisation brings in its train defects that the war has also exposed, such as bureaucracy, but this, according to Mr. Hobson, would be minimised by representative self-government. With the advent of the new order of self-government in industry, certain changes should be effected in the incentives which induce men to work. Mr. Hobson's solution is the cutting off of high and unearned incomes, for he believes that special workers are overpaid, and these reductions would diminish the risk in business and tend to stabilise conditions. As in all of Mr. Hobson's books, his impartial and penetrating analysis and knowledge of our social and economic system, and his awareness of the complexity of the problems involved call for full consideration of his message.

J. E.

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LABOR. By B. E. Lowe. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. xliii, 439.

An historical summary of the four phases of action contributing to international labor legislation introduces this book. The Socialist movement is regarded as more potent in this respect than the Trade-Union movement; by far the larger credit, however, is given social reformers and their activities in behalf of Sunday laws, social insurance, and the amelioration of occupational diseases and unemployment. Intergovernmental action, especially the Bern conventions, is more elaborately treated in Part II, International Labor Legislation.

Part I treats of the Movement for International Labor Legislation. That "there was no international law of labor" until 1914, resulted from choosing the first horn of the dilemma: "Fail to protect labor and ultimately ruin industry, protect labor and lose industrial prestige." The

choice resulted from the feeling that the "deluge" could be postponed at least to the next generation. The problem is that of our own federal protection of labor writ large; unfortunately America has little to offer as precedent in regard to the essentials: vital statistics, precise labor law, and efficient inspection.

The latter half of the book is given over to invaluable appendices, including items of Labor Law Internationally Adopted, and Labor Resolutions Internationally Subscribed. A voluminous Bibliography is followed by a supplement, The International Labor Organization of the League of Nations.

**THE SHANTUNG QUESTION.** By Ge-Zay Wood. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922. Pp. 372. Price, \$5.

Mr. Wood, a member of the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference, has written a number of other books which form the context for this particular problem. After several chapters of historical introduction, there follows a discussion of the Shantung Question at the Versailles Peace Conference. Here America, especially Woodrow Wilson, is held accountable for the treatment of China: "In order to secure Japan's adherence to a League of Nations Mr. Wilson had thought it necessary to accept a solution that was insisted on by Japan." The English delegates are absolved, because "the sense of honor and obligation was fostered at the sacrifice of international justice and morality." The issue between China and Japan boiled down to the economic interests involved, especially the railway and mining concessions in Shantung. The Washington Conference gave China another opportunity of presenting her case; only, however, after she had given up her historical arguments and accepted "the position of a supplicant, that of trying to get back from Japan as much as possible, after granting that everything in Shantung was lost to her." Happily, however, not only was the agreement there made "favorably received at home" so far as China was concerned, but the terms are "much better than hoped for" even as outlined in the tentative draft presented at Versailles. The book is lucid and exhaustive. Mr. Wood at times, however, loses his judicial poise by drawing inferences of a controversial nature; a better effect could have been gained by giving the reader's judgment an opportunity to react to the facts. The American public is fortunate in having this additional evidence for understanding the problems of the Pacific and the Orient.

**THE METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE STATE.** By Professor L. T. Hobhouse, LL.D. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1922.

This interesting work, which has already attracted a good deal of attention, is probably the most trenchant criticism of the Hegelian theory of the State that has yet appeared. Even those who attach a high value to Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*, Green's *Lectures on Political Obligation*, and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State* may profit by Professor Hobhouse's comments and enjoy some of the points that he makes. Taken in conjunction with his books on *The Rational Good* and *The Elements of Social Justice*, which have already been noticed in this JOURNAL, it will enable readers to gain a pretty thorough insight into the ethical, social and political opinions of the author, who is now generally recognised as one of the foremost writers on these subjects.

It is perhaps not unfair to add, however, that he appears to be a good deal stronger in criticism than in systematic construction.

LONDON.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

DIVINE IMAGINING: an essay on the First Principles of Philosophy. By Douglas Fawcett. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1921. Pp. xxviii, 249.

This book has no very direct bearing upon Ethics; but it may be commended to the attention of our readers, especially those who are already acquainted with the previous writings of its author. It contains a shorter statement of the general view set forth in his book on *The World as Imagination*. His contention is that Imagination yields a more secure basis for an idealistic philosophy than Reason, Feeling or Intuition. The theory that he develops bears a considerable resemblance to that of Advaita Vedantism, with the substitution of Imagination for Mâya. This change has some ethical importance; for it is certainly easier to connect moral purpose with Imagination than with the Oriental ideas of Mâya or Avidya.

Mr. Fawcett supports his thesis with a great deal of vigour, and his speculations can hardly fail to have a great fascination for any one whose heart is in the highlands of metaphysical adventure.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

LONDON.

THE LAW IN BUSINESS PROBLEMS. By Lincoln Frederick Schaub and Nathan Isaacs. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 821.

A product of the authors' experience in the teaching of commercial law in collegiate schools of business, differing in point of view and methods from most books in this subject. This book aims, by the case system, to give some understanding of the legal rules governing the more familiar business transactions and relations, especially with reference to Contracts. Its principal concern is to show the legal system in its relation to the problems and policies of business organization and administration. It is a study of the part played by the law in the "anatomy of business." Intended for mature readers whose chief interest lies in business, whether or not they have any special knowledge of law.

THE VOICE OF JERUSALEM. By Israel Zangwill. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. Pp. 368. Price, \$3.00.

"Christianity, *quâ* its ethic of love and pity and self-sacrifice, is at bottom a question of psychology: it is the evolution of the human spirit to a plane as much transcending the natural man's as the species *homo* transcends the animal." So Zangwill writes in "The Voice of Jerusalem," and adds that "the Jews . . . reached this phase of evolution centuries before the rest of the world." The rest of the world has in the main not reached it at all: "In the recent war . . . the Berserker psychology has been the dominating influence."

With the memory of the war still vivid and the hatred and reaction which it engendered only too manifest, few can dissent from Zangwill's conclusion that the Jews are more Christian than the Christians and that the hope of the world, if there is any such, is in the voice of Jerusalem, the age-long hope and vision of Judaism of a world united in a true federation of brotherhood and acknowledging a common God. Zangwill does not assert that all the prophets of the millennium have been Jews; he pays tribute to General Smuts and other idealists. But he is proud of his race and of their devotion to an ideal through two thousand years of persecution.

The book is a collection of essays and papers printed in magazines over a

period of years. A good deal of space is devoted to the Zionist movement upon which Zangwill holds sensible opinions.

Only one nation in our time has endured so much as the Jew. Zangwill concludes his book thus: "One people is suffering more. That people, whose ancient realm held the legendary Eden, has now for a hiding place the pit of Hell. I bow before this higher majesty of sorrow. I take the crown of thorns from Israel's head and I place it upon Armenia's."

C. H. G.

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CLOW, W. M. *The Quest of Industrial Peace.* New York: George H. Doran Co. 1922. Pp. 300. Price, \$1.75 net.

COX, GEORGE CLARK. *The Public Conscience: A case book in ethics.* New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1922. Pp. 483. Price, \$3.00

DENSMORE, FRANCES. *Northern Ute Music.* Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 75. 1922. Pp. 213.

GALLOWAY, T. W. *Biology of Sex.* New York: D. C. Heath and Co. Revised Edition, 1922. Pp. 149.

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HALDANE, VISCOUNT. *The Philosophy of Humanism, and of Other Subjects.* London: John Murray. 1922. Pp. xiv, 302. Price, 12s. net.

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JACOBS, LEO. *Three Types of Practical Ethical Movements of the Last Half Century.* New York: Macmillan. 1922. Pp. 183. Price, \$1.50.

LYNCH, ARTHUR. *Ethics.* London: Cassell and Co., Ltd. 1922. Pp. xii, 324. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

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MAETRA, SHISIR KUMAR. *The Neoromantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy.* Calcutta: The Book Company. 1922. Pp. vi, 268. Price, 7s. 6d. net.

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RIVERS, W. H. R. *Instinct and the Unconscious.* Cambridge: University Press. 1922. Pp. viii, 277. Price, 12s. net.

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